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Abstract 
Learning through networks has been considered as an important research topic for 
several years now. Technological learning is more and more based on a combination 
of internal and external learning and firms need to develop both technological and 
social capital for that purpose. This paper analyses the relationship between both types 
of capital and their impact on the technological performance of companies in high-
tech industries. We claim and find empirical evidence for decreasing marginal returns 
on social capital. Technological capital and social capital mutually reinforce each 
other’s effect on the rate of innovation for companies with small patent and alliance 
portfolios. However, when the patent portfolio and network of alliances are extensive, 
companies risk to over-invest since optimal levels of social capital become smaller at 
higher levels of technological capital and the marginal benefits of investing in 
technological capital decreases the higher the levels of social capital. Finally, we find 
empirical evidence that companies that explore novel and pioneering technologies 
have higher levels of innovation performance in subsequent years than companies that 
solely invest in incremental innovations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This study investigates the relationship between the technological performance of 
companies in high-tech industries and their technological and social capital. More 
specifically, we focus on three main research topics. First, we consider whether a 
firm’s technological and social capital - i.e. its patent stock and portfolio of 
technology alliances - are mutually enforcing factors that together determine the rate 
of innovation, or, alternatively, whether they can be considered as substitutes. We also 
address the question of whether an optimal mix of resources exists, which results into 
above average technological performance. Second, following Stuart (2000) we argue 
that not so much the size of the alliance portfolio, but the technological performance 
of the partnering firms to whom a focal firm is connected determines the rate of 
innovation of the latter. Finally, we aim to find out whether companies that explore 
new technologies have higher rates of innovation than companies that are primarily 
engaged in exploiting and strengthening their existing technology base.  
 
The apparent importance of knowledge, especially in high tech industries, gave rise to 
a stream of research focusing on knowledge as the single most important resource 
within an organisation (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Conner and Prahalad, 1996) and has 
led to the emergence of the knowledge based theory of the firm (Grant, 1997). In 
similar vein, a number of recent studies have investigated the relationship between a 
portfolio of technology alliances and (technological) firm performance (Hagedoorn 
and Schakenraad, 1994; Shan et al., 1994; Powell et al., 1996; Mitchell and Singh 
1996; Stuart, 2000). Firms are increasingly forced to combine internal technological 
strengths with those of other firms as R&D costs soar rapidly and technological 
dynamics speed up. Products require more and more sophisticated technologies and 
increasingly emerging technologies have the potential to undermine the competitive 
positions of incumbents. Many of these alliances are ‘learning alliances’ through 
which companies can speed up their capability development and exploit knowledge 
developed by others (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 1995). Because in today’s turbulent 
technological environment no single firm is able to come up with all the required 
technological capabilities themselves, firms are increasingly induced to form these 
‘learning alliances’. In order to overcome the lack of specific technological 
capabilities they tap into other companies’ technological assets. Market transactions 
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are generally considered to be a weak alternative to alliances because most valuable 
knowledge is cumulative and tacit in nature. This specific nature makes it hard to 
transfer between organizations through market transactions (Mowery, 1988; Mowery 
et al., 1995; Osborn and Baughn, 1990).  
 
Technological learning is increasingly based on a combination of internal and external 
learning: internal learning comes about by the internal development of new products 
and through internal R&D processes, external learning thrives on technology acquired 
through technology alliances. Both types of learning are considered complements 
reinforcing each other’s productivity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Duysters and 
Hagedoorn, 2000). Moreover, companies can only tap into other companies’ 
technology base successfully if they have sufficient absorptive capacity (Lane and 
Lubatkin, 1998). In its turn, absorptive capacity results from investments in internal 
technological know-how. Hence, internal technological knowledge and external 
technology acquisition via alliances are considered complements. But surprisingly, 
there are to our knowledge no large-sample empirical studies that focus on the 
combined effect of internal and (quasi) external knowledge acquisition on the 
technological innovative performance4.  
  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Technological and social capital 
 
This paper builds on the knowledge-based view of the firm. Over time accumulated 
knowledge assets constitute the source of a firm’s sustainable competitive advantage 
in the marketplace (Kogut and Zander, 1996; Spender, 1996). Firm specific 
knowledge assets are of strategic interest – they are distinctive competences - because 
they are rare, imperfectly tradable and hard to imitate and must be build within the 
organization internally as long as part of the technological know-how is not 
                                                     
4  Ahuja (2000) focuses on the impact of technical, commercial and social capital of companies on 
the formation of new alliances. Commercial resources are those required to convert technical 
innovations to products and services. They consist of manufacturing and marketing capabilities 
and entail manufacturing facilities and service and distribution networks (Mitchell, 1989; Teece, 
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articulated or tacit in nature. The development of knowledge assets (or technological 
capital) is difficult, time consuming and expensive. Moreover, developing 
technological capabilities is a risky venture because R&D up-front costs may be huge 
and the technological and commercial outcomes may be highly uncertain (Mitchell 
and Singh, 1992).  
 
Because of the cumulative character of technology, the current technological position 
of a company is shaped by the path it has traveled (Teece et al., 1997). Hence, path 
dependency is crucial: previous investments in and strategic choices about technology 
development not only explain the current position of a company, but they also 
constrain the future options of companies. Therefore, companies that failed to build 
up a technological capability in the past may find it difficult to catch up later by 
means of internal development (Shan, 1990). Furthermore, existing technological 
capabilities may reduce a firm’s capacity to adapt to new commercial challenges or to 
rejuvenate its capabilities in the face of new, ‘competence destroying’ technologies 
(Abernathy and Clark, 1985). 
 
Accumulated technological competence can therefore be seen as the result of past 
innovative activities of a firm (Podolny and Stuart, 1995; Stuart et al., 1999). As a 
result, we can expect that firms with well developed technological assets will be more 
innovative than other firms under conditions of relative technological stability – i.e. 
when companies can build on their previously developed knowledge. This argument 
suggests the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The larger the technological capabilities a firm has accumulated in 
the past the higher its current rate of innovation.  
 
Being centrally positioned in a network of technology alliances has been recognized 
as a distinctive and important form of capital - social capital - of innovative 
companies (Gulati, 1995, 1999). Especially in rapidly changing technological fields 
internal R&D efforts need to be complemented by external means of technology 
acquisition. The creation of a strategic alliance network can facilitate the access to 
technological resources across industries or technological fields. Alliances are often 
                                                                                                                                                        
1986). In what follows we focus on the relationship between technical and social capital and 
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used by companies as instruments to acquire technological knowledge and to develop 
new skills that reside within the partnering companies (Hamel, 1991; Hagedoorn and 
Schakenraad, 1994; Powell et al., 1996). Previous research established that alliances 
often have a positive impact on the performance of companies (Baum and Oliver, 
1991; Mitchell and Singh, 1996; Uzzi, 1996; Powell et al., 1996; Hagedoorn and 
Schakenraad, 1994). These authors found in different research settings a positive 
relationship between technological alliances and rates of innovation. A notable 
exception is the work of Stuart (2000) who found no significant relationship between 
the number of alliances and the growth rate or rate of innovation of semiconductor 
firms.  
 
A portfolio with too many alliances may lead to saturation and overembeddedness 
(Kogut et al., 1992; Uzzi, 1997). Therefore, at high levels of embeddedness marginal 
benefits of forming new linkages will be low and marginal costs of additional links 
will be relatively high (Ahuja, 2000). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998, p. 245) argue that 
the collective social capital resulting from dense networks can limit a firm’s 
“openness to information and to alternative ways of doing things, producing forms of 
collective blindness that sometimes have disastrous effects”. At the same time 
managerial costs increase significantly because not only individual alliances need 
management attention, but management also has to coordinate across linkages 
(Harrigan, 1985). Gomes-Casseres (1996) has shown that there is a natural limit to the 
number of alliances that a company can manage successfully. Therefore, we argue 
that there is a non-linear relationship between the social capital of a company and its 
rate of innovation. Highly embedded companies or firms with poorly developed social 
capital will have the lowest rates of innovation. In particular firms at intermediate 
levels of embeddedness will show the highest rates of innovation. This argument 
suggests the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The prior involvement of a company in technology-based alliances 
is related in a curvilinear way (inverted-U shaped) to its rate of 
innovation. 
 
As discussed above, technological learning is increasingly based on a combination of 
internal and external learning. Both types of learning have been described in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
ignore the linkages with commercial capital. 
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literature as complements reinforcing each other’s productivity (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Duysters and Hagedoorn, 2000).  
 
Whether social and technological capital would have mutually reinforcing effects 
under all circumstances is however open for debate. Firms with low degrees of 
technological competences and social capital, in terms of the number of alliances they 
have, will benefit considerably from entering new alliances since they provide access 
to new and valuable technological knowledge. Firms with poorly developed 
technological capital have strong incentives to get access to the technological capital 
of other firms through interorganizational alliances (Mitchell and Singh, 1996). These 
companies will also benefit from strengthening the internal knowledge base as this 
increases their absorptive capacity so that its partners’ knowledge can better be valued 
and assimilated (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998).  
 
Firms with unique internal knowledge resources are likely to be attractive to other 
firms that expect to benefit from getting access to these resources by means of 
alliances (Baum et al., 2000). As a result, firms with unique technological resources 
have more opportunities to collaborate than firms with poorly developed resources. 
However, firms that are already well endowed with technological capital have fewer 
incentives to cooperate in order to improve their own rate of innovation (Ahuja, 
2000). Because these companies have already developed leading edge technological 
competences they are likely to learn to a lesser extent from their partners than vice 
versa (Hamel et al., 1989; Kale et al., 1999; Khanna et al., 1998). As a result, a 
company that is well endowed with technological competences is likely to benefit 
only marginally from extending its alliance network beyond a critical threshold 
because it increases the chance that internally developed and externally acquired 
technology may overlap or that the marginal value of getting access to another 
company’s knowledge base is smaller than the cost to set up and manage the alliance 
(Harrigan, 1985). Hence, although it is very unlikely that companies can develop their 
technological resources completely in-house, those that have unique technological 
resources need only a relatively small alliance network to ensure high rates of 
innovation. One can imagine that beyond a critical threshold both types of capital 
substitute each other and extending social capital may become a liability. This 
argument suggests the following hypothesis: 
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 Hypothesis 3: At low levels, internal technological capabilities (technological 
capital) and external acquisition of technology through 
technological alliances (social capital) reinforce each other’s effect 
on the rate of innovation. At high levels, they weaken each other’s 
effect. 
 
The combination of hypotheses 2 and 3 entails the possibility that companies can 
realize the highest rates of innovation by two different types of strategies that can 
coexist in the same industry. The first strategy is based on a considerable alliance 
network and a small (potentially specialized) technological capital. This provides the 
company with ample opportunities to tap into its partners’ technology resources or to 
co-develop innovations by combining (complementary) skills. The second strategy 
emphasizes the internal development of innovations in the company. The company 
has an extensive patent portfolio and needs only a few alliances to ensure that it has 
the required technology to strengthen or to continue its strong technological 
performance. Companies with moderate values for both types of capital, failing to 
stick to one of these two strategies, are ‘stuck in the middle’. Thus:  
 
Hypothesis 4: Companies with extensive (small) internal technological capabilities 
and a small (extensive) alliance network have the highest rates of 
innovation. Both profiles may successfully coexist in an industry.  
 
Stuart (2000) argues that the technological (and economic) performance of companies 
is not so much determined by the size of the alliance network but rather by the 
characteristics of the focal company’s alliance partners5. If companies enter alliances 
to get access to other firms’ technology, then those with a large stock of technological 
resources are highly attractive as potential alliance partners. Stuart finds evidence that 
alliances with partners that are technologically well endowed have a larger positive 
impact on post-alliance performance of the focal firm. In high-tech industries the 
technological competencies of alliance partners determine in part the focal company’s 
potential to learn. Teaming up with skilled innovative companies with unique 
technological assets offers a company the best opportunities to learn and thus to 
invigorate its competitive position.  
                                                     
5  Similarly, Baum et al. (2000) argue that the performance of biotechnology start-ups is positively 
influenced by the technological capabilities of the partnering companies.  
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 Hypothesis 5: The stronger the technological capabilities of a company’s alliance 
partners, the higher its innovation rate. 
 
Exploring new technologies 
 
We have already argued that a mutual positive feedback between experience and 
competence exists. This virtuous cycle enables companies to build up unique 
technological skills, which potentially lead to competitive advantages in the 
marketplace. The increased ease of learning within particular technologies facilitates 
the exploitation of these technologies compared to the exploration of new 
technologies (Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1991). 
 
The downside of this path dependency is that it increases the likelihood of a company 
falling in the so-called familiarity trap (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001)6. It is argued that 
experience and competence in a specific set of technologies lead to the emergence of 
a dominant and increasingly rigid technological paradigm. This, in turn, reduces the 
probability of a company’s willingness to experiment with other problem solving 
approaches. This absence of experimentation reduces the chance that a company will 
discover new technological opportunities that are assumed to be large in high tech 
industries (Jaffe, 1986; Lunn and Martin, 1986; Levin et al., 1985).  
 
To avoid familiarity traps companies can explore novel technologies - i.e. 
technologies that are new to the organization even though they may have been in 
existence earlier (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). Experimenting with novel technologies 
allows a company to value the potential of these technologies in a more accurate way 
                                                     
6  Learning traps (Levinthal and March, 1993) are closely related to the concept of competency 
traps (Levitt and March, 1988). “Competency traps are defined to occur ‘when favorable 
performance with an inferior procedure leads an organization to accumulate more experience 
with it, thus keeping experience with a superior procedure inadequate to make it rewarding to 
use’ (Levitt and March, 1988: 322). Learning traps, on the other hand, embody the conflict 
between routines that enable the organization to perform well in the short run but may position 
the organization unfavorably for the future. Thus, while competency traps entail choices 
between two procedures or routines targeted towards the same outcome, the learning traps we 
discuss here are about the implications of the same routines for two different outcomes such as 
reliable and predictable outputs that are necessary for immediate or short-run performance, and 
breakthrough inventions that may form the basis of superior performance in the future.” (Ahuja 
and Lampert, 2001: 523) 
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(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Explorative companies are better positioned to discover 
the technological and commercial potentials of novel technologies. They may also be 
better prepared to value the potential competitive threat of disruptive technologies 
(Bower and Christensen, 1995; Christensen and Raynor, 2003) or competence 
destroying technologies early on (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986). Exploring novel technologies challenges the dominant problem-
solving paradigm in companies (Lei et al., 1996). Unfamiliar technologies may force 
a firm to search for new cognitive maps that open up new avenues for research. 
Hence, we may expect that companies that experiment with novel technologies are 
better positioned to have a higher rate of innovation than firms that invest all their 
efforts in exploiting existing, familiar technologies.  
 
Exploring novel technologies, however, is only advantageous up to a point. Investing 
excessively in exploration of novel technologies may lead to confusion: exploration of 
unfamiliar technologies and exploitation of familiar ones have to be balanced to be 
productive. As argued by March (1991) and Levinthal and March (1993) firms 
engaging in exploration exclusively, only suffer from the costs associated with 
experimentation without exploiting its benefits. Moreover, there will always be a 
trade-off between investing in deepening and upgrading the existing technologies to 
safeguard profits today and exploring new technologies to secure future profits 
(Rowley et al., 2000; Levinthal and March, 1981). Finally, scattering R&D resources 
on many novel technologies may eventually lead to diseconomies of scale within the 
individual technologies (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). Therefore, we argue that: 
 
Hypothesis 6: A firm’s rate of innovation is related in a curvilinear way (inverted-
U shaped) to its exploration of novel technologies in the past.  
 
Innovative firms generally search for technological solutions within the scope of what 
has been invented before. They tend to build on their own technological successes and 
on those of others. Previous solutions offer technologists or scientists an anchor to 
move forward. As a result, building on technological antecedents is less risky than 
working on a de novo innovation (Hoskisson et al., 1993; Hoskisson et al., 1994). 
 
Ahuja and Lampert (2001) refer to the tendency of firms to search near to old 
solutions as the propinquity or nearness trap. Often interesting technological fields 
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remain unexplored when companies rely too much on old solutions. The literature 
however suggests that important inventions emerge, in particular, from these 
unexplored areas (Utterback, 1994). Experimenting with pioneering technologies - i.e. 
technologies that do not build on existing technologies (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001) - is 
one possible way to circumvent the dangers of the propinquity trap. Experimenting 
with pioneering technologies is an attempt to jump to different technological 
trajectories (Dosi, 1988; Foster, 1986; Sahal, 1985). Since pioneering technologies 
offer fundamentally new solutions they may generate large future profit streams for 
the innovative company. At the same time, they entail large risks typical for radical 
innovations. However, when a company increases the number of experiments it also 
inflates the probability that a major, successful innovation will pop up sooner or later. 
We expect that a company having successfully patented a ‘pioneering technology’-
innovation will increase its rate of innovation in the subsequent years.  
 
Hypothesis 7:  A firm’s rate of innovation is positively related to its success in 
pioneering technologies in the past. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL SETTING 
 
Definition and characteristics 
The hypotheses are tested on the population of ASIC-producers that were active in the 
period 1988-1996. ASICs - i.e. application-specific integrated circuits - are a special type 
of ICs (integrated circuits) accounting for about 12 % of worldwide IC sales in 1995. In 
contrast with the general purpose ICs such as DRAMs and microprocessors, ASICs are 
build to perform only one particular function – e.g. converting digital signals of a CD 
into music7.  
 
The ASIC market is a typical high-tech industry where technology is the driving force 
shaping competition among firms. R&D-to-sales ratios are exceptionally high. The 
                                                     
7  The term 'ASIC', as now in use in the industry, is a misnomer. In reality these ICs are customer-
specific rather than application-specific since an ASIC is a device made for a specific customer. A 
device which is made for one particular type of system function (e.g. disk-drives, CD-players, 
video compressing, etc...) but is sold to more than one customer, is called an ASSP (application-
specific standard product, sometimes also called ASIPs - application-specific integrated 
processors). Although ASSPs are manufactured using ASIC technology, they are ultimately sold 
as standard devices to large numbers of users. 
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ASIC market is divided into three submarkets. According to the "Integrated Circuit 
Engineering Corporation" (ICE) the ASIC market includes the following categories of 
ICs: gate arrays (GA), full custom ICs (FC), and programmable logic devices (PLDs). 
Formal definitions are given in Table 1 and diagrammed in Figure 1. 
 
 Insert Table 1 about here 
 Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
A wide range of specific system functions can be fabricated alternatively by gate 
arrays, full custom devices or PLDs. These three ASIC-categories are different 
devices realising the same system functionalities. As a result, there is almost no 
affinity between the targeted system function and the type of ASIC to use8. ASIC 
vendors typically have to make a choice between the three ASIC types minimizing the 
volume-dependent total cost per chip. PLDs are the cheapest solution for low volume 
ASICs. Once the production volume exceeds the level of a few thousands units, gate 
arrays become the most interesting ASIC solution. Custom ICs are the most efficient 
solution for production volumes that exceed several hundred-thousands of ASICs. 
 
 Insert Figure 2 here 
 
Different players and motives for technology alliances 
The development and production of ASICs requires the interplay between different 
economic agents. The most important participants are the ASIC design houses, IC 
manufacturing facilities, electronic system houses and CAD-tool vendors. This list can 
be enlarged by a number of auxiliary and/or intermediate players, such as companies 
offering services in the microelectronics field, firms that translate customers' needs into 
the specifications for the design of ASICs, and university labs. The interplay between 
different agents is shown in Figure 3. The structure of the interplay between the different 
economic actors has not changed in a structural way during the period of observation.  
 
 Insert Figure3 here 
                                                     
8  The only exception is linear arrays, which are used to design analog or mixed (analog/digital) 
system functions. Linear arrays are applied mainly in the telecommunication and consumer 
electronics markets, where most signals are analog in nature. 
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 Electronic system manufacturers usually build a foothold in the ASIC market by 
vertical integration: they want to achieve or sustain a competitive advantage for their 
electronic systems through proprietary ASIC designs. Electronic system 
manufacturers also make corporate-wide deals and second-source agreements with 
foundries. Large system manufacturers have their own ASIC design house and 
foundry or they acquire one. Vertically integrated system manufacturers still 
cooperate with specialised design houses because of recurrent peaks in design work. 
Large, integrated electronic system manufacturers have their own fab-lines. Their 
ASICs are processed together with standard ICs.9 Smaller companies set up 
agreements with different foundries to process their ASICs. Second-source 
agreements are frequently used in order to ensure availability of ASICs on time and to 
avoid lock-in situations. Captive producers - e.g., IBM and DEC - also establish 
second-source agreements because of peaks in demand. As ASIC-designs become 
increasingly complex, companies establish numerous joint development and cross-
licensing agreements. Some ASIC vendors are also active in the CAD-tool market - 
e.g., VLSI Technology. The CAD-tool market is small, and tool development is very 
expensive. Installing the same CAD-infrastructure among interacting firms greatly 
enhances technology transfer. Therefore, numerous strategic alliances are established 
between ASIC producers and CAD-tool vendors. The CAD-tool market is 
furthermore characterised by an ongoing process of acquisitions by the largest CAD-
tool vendors and entries by de novo firms and spin-offs. 
 
Given these characteristics of the industry, most strategic alliances in the ASIC-industry 
are likely to be strategic tools for external technology sourcing or joint development. In a 
high-tech environment like the ASIC-industry, firms are likely to link up with each other 
in order to keep up with the newest technologies. Stand-alone strategies might no 
longer be viable, even for the largest companies (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1996).  
 
                                                     
 9 Processing ASICs together with standard ICs creates a considerable cost advantage, 
but is also characterised by disadvantages vis-à-vis specialized ASIC-foundries in 
terms of flexibility and the minimum efficient scale of production runs. 
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DATA, VARIABLES AND MODELING 
 
Data 
Three types of data are combined in this paper. The cumulated technology alliances 
between the different players in the ASIC technology field capture social capital. 
Technological capital is measured by means of the cumulated US patents of each 
company. Finally, a set of financial data is gathered for each ASIC producer. 
 
The data on strategic alliances were selected from the MERIT-CATI database on 
technology alliances (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1993). The selection included strategic 
alliances10 which major focus was on (technological developments in) the ASIC-
industry. The MERIT-CATI databank covers the period between 1975 and 1996: for that 
period 288 ASIC related strategic technology alliances were detected. There were 130 
different firms involved in these alliances. A sharp increase in SAs occurred in the early 
and mid-eighties. Their popularity diminished in the late eighties and the early nineties. 
SAs in the ASIC industry are mainly non-equity agreements (79.2%) of which the 
majority is joint development agreements (56.9% of all SAs). Joint ventures, which 
account for 12.8% in the ASIC industry are the most important form of equity SAs. 
 
To measure technological capital, we used patent data from the U.S. Patent Office for 
all companies involved in the design and production of ASICs, also those based 
outside the US11. Working with U.S. patents - the largest patent market - is preferable 
to the use of several national patent systems. Nations differ in their application of 
standards, systems to grant patents and value of the protection granted (Basberg, 
1987; Griliches, 1990). Especially in industries where companies operate on a global 
scale, such as the ASIC-industry, U.S. patents are a good proxy for companies’ 
worldwide innovative performance12.  
 
                                                     
10. Strategic technology alliances include joint research projects, joint development agreements, cross 
licensing, (mutual) second source agreements, technology sharing, R&D consortia, minority holdings 
and joint ventures, but no licensing agreements or production and marketing agreements. 
11  The patents were selected by means of a query on ‘ASIC’ and related concepts/definitions such as 
‘gate array’, ‘linear array’, ‘FPGA’, ‘PLD’, ‘full custom’, ‘SPGA’ and ‘EPAC’.  
12  Patents can be categorized by means of the International Patent Classification, an internationally 
recognized hierarchical classification system comprising 118 broad sections and 624 subclasses 
nested within the classes. It is furthermore possible to subdivide the subclasses into 67.000 
groups. ASIC-related patents are classified in a relatively small set of subclasses (75 in total). 
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Financial data of ASIC producers have been gathered from different sources among 
which the annual ICE reports (McClean, 1985-1998). The data contain the ASIC-
sales, the distribution of the ASIC-sales across the three segments, R&D-intensity on 
the corporate level and total sales of these companies. We furthermore included the 
nationality of each company.  
 
Variable definitions and operationalization 
 
To test the hypotheses we constructed a number of variables. Table 2 summarizes 
them. 
 
Insert here table 2 
 
 
Dependent variable 
Explaining the technological learning capacity of different ASIC producers requires 
an operationalization of the size of a company’s technological capital. Technological 
capital is traditionally operationalized by patents granted to an innovating company. 
However, patents are not equal in value. Some patents refer to basic knowledge at the 
core of a technology, while others are merely of incremental value. The technological 
importance of innovations can thus be measured with patent citations (Albert et al., 
1991; Narin et al., 1987). Therefore, the value of patents can be incorporated in our 
dependent variable by weighting the patents by the number of received citations. In 
order to correct for right-hand censoring we estimated the number of citations patents 
would receive over their life-span, based on the number of citations they received 
with the help of Hall et al.’s (2001) simulated cumulative lag distribution tables, using 
months rather than years. The NBER citations database was used for citation-
information (Hall et al., 2001). Thereafter we used a nonlinear weighting scheme, 
assuming the marginal informational content increases with the number of citations. 
Trajtenberg (1990) provides a weighting model for this. The time the company 
applied for the patent was used rather than the year when it was granted to the firm 
because a patent application is a signal that a company has developed a technological 
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innovation. The dependent variable thus measures the number of patents that a 
company applied for in a particular year weighted by their received citations13. 
 
Independent variables 
The first 5 hypotheses suggest a relationship between a firm’s prior technological 
capital, its social capital and the technological characteristics of its alliance partners 
on the one hand and its ex post technological performance on the other hand. 
 
Cumulative technological capital is calculated as the number of ASIC-related patents 
that an ASIC-producer obtained in the previous four years. Patents granted to a 
company are used to measure in an indirect way the technological competence of a 
company (Narin et al., 1987). Studies about R&D depreciation (Griliches, 1979, 
1984) suggests that knowledge capital depreciates sharply, losing most of its 
economic value within 5 years. A moving window of 4 to 5 years is therefore the 
appropriate time frame for assessing the technological impact in high-tech industries 
(Podolny and Stuart, 1995; Stuart and Podolny, 1996; Henderson and Cockburn, 
1996; Ahuja, 2000). In this paper we use the cumulated patents obtained by a firm 
during the 4 years previous to the year of observation as a measure for the 
technological competence of an ASIC producer. Variables using a 3 and 5-year time 
window were also calculated to check for the sensitivity of this variable to the length 
of the time period. These variables are highly correlated with the 4-year time window 
(r = 0.94 for the 3 year window and 0.96 for the 5 year window), suggesting that the 
measurement of technological capital is not sensitive to the choice of any of these 
particular time windows. 
 
Following Gulati (1995), we computed social capital from matrices including all alliance 
activities of the ASIC-producers prior to a given year. In constructing measures of social 
capital based on past alliances, a number of choices have been made. First, we do not 
consider different types of alliances separately14. Second, some authors weigh each type 
                                                     
13  Of course, we only keep track of patents that have been granted by the U.S. Patent Office before 
the end of 2000. The observation period is 1988-1996. We do not have a significant bias at the 
end of that period, because most patents are granted within a period of 2 to 3 years (average time 
for all patents in the sample is 26 months). Of the 1381 patents that were filed between 1/1/1988 
and 31/12/1996 only 50 (or 3.6%) were granted after 4 years. 
14  Figure 5 gives an overview of the different alliance types: alliances vary from equity joint-ventures 
and minority holdings with a strong organizational commitment and interdependence between allies 
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of SA according to the ‘strength’ of their relationship (see Contractor and Lorange, 
1988; Gulati 1995; Nohria and Garcia-Pont 1991). As some technology alliances are 
more important than others in creating and transferring technological know-how we 
followed this weighting procedure to construct the social capital variable15. The third 
choice relates to the length of the period during which the existing alliance portfolio is 
likely to have an influence on the current technological performance of a company. All 
past alliances can be included into the calculation of social capital assuming that all prior 
ties, no matter how long ago they were established, have an impact on current firm 
behavior. However, we chose for a moving window approach, assuming that only 
‘ongoing’ alliances have an impact on the technological performance of the focal firm. 
For the alliance activities of the ASIC producers we have an indication about the 
termination of 62 (21.5%) alliances in the observation period 1988-1996. We assumed 
they have an impact on the rate of innovation as long as they were not terminated. For 
the other alliances we assume that the lifespan of alliances is five years (Kogut 1988, 
1989).  
 
The innovative performance of a company’s partners can be modeled in different 
ways. Basically, we follow the method developed by Stuart (2000). The innovative 
performance of a firm i at time t is denoted as dit. For each year in the observation 
period 1988-1996, an Nx1 vector dt represents the innovation scores of the N firms in 
the sample. Combining these innovation scores with alliance activity in the ASIC-
industry allows the construction of compact, time-varying innovation measures of the 
alliance partners of each company. These measures are computed by creating first a 
NxN (firm-by-firm) time changing symmetrical alliance matrices, labeled Wt=[wijt]. 
The innovative performance of the alliance partners of each ASIC-producer at time t 
(pt) is the product of the alliance matrix with the corresponding vector of innovative 
performance scores. As a result pt is a time-changing vector containing the summed 
innovative performance scores for the allies of each ASIC producer. 
                                                                                                                                                        
to non-equity alliances which imply only moderate levels of organizational commitment (although 
stronger than arms' length licensing agreements). 
15  Type    Weight Type    Weight 
 Cross licensing   1 R&D contract    4 
 Technology sharing   2 Joint development agreement 4 
(Mutual) second source agreement 3 Minority holding   5 
State intervention R&D   3 Joint venture   6 
Research corporation   3   
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 The innovative performance of the partners can be measured in different ways. One 
possible way is to count the patents received by each of the companies during the 
previous 4 or 5 years (Stuart and Podolny, 1996; Ahuja, 2000; Baum, Calabrese and 
Silverman, 2000). An alternative is to weight these patents by the number of times 
they have been cited by more recent patents. In order to prevent a truncation bias in 
this weighting procedure we used the patent citations of the first five years after the 
patent was applied for only. This way, older patents were treated similarly to newer 
patents. 
  
Novel technologies are measured by the degree to which a company experiments with 
technologies this firm did not use before (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). To construct this 
variable we used the International Patent Classification (IPC), which is an 
internationally recognized hierarchical classification system. We computed this 
variable using the subclass level of the IPC. Novel technologies were calculated as the 
number of new technology ‘subclasses’ that were entered in the previous 3 years. A 
company was assumed “…to have entered a new subclass when it first applies for a 
patent in a subclass in which it had not patented in the previous 4 years” (Ahuja and 
Lampert, 2001: p. 533). This four-year time window results from the fact that 
technological knowledge depreciates rapidly: not being active in a technology 
subclass for a considerable period of time will significantly shrink a company’s viable 
knowledge in that technological field. A time window of 4 to 5 years is considered an 
appropriate time span over which the technology is valuable for a company in high-
tech industries (Stuart and Podolny, 1996; Ahuja, 2000).  
 
Ahuja and Lampert (2001) define pioneering technologies as technologies that do not 
build on prior technologies. Patent regulations require companies to indicate how 
much they are indebted to the technological heritage by citing the patents they build 
on. Companies that apply for a patent that cite no other patents are exploring 
technological fields that have been left untouched so far. Therefore this variable is 
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computed as the number of a company’s patents that cite no more than one other 
patent16. 
 
Control variables 
We included four types of dummy variables. A first variable indicates in which 
economic block the company is headquartered. Following the Triad-concept of the world 
economy, a company can be headquartered in North America, Asia or Europe - the 
default is North-America. Firms from a different home country may differ in their 
propensity to patent. Next to that, Asian and European firms may be less inclined to 
patent in the USA even when the semiconductor industry is widely recognized as a 
global industry. 
 
Annual dummy variables were included to capture changes over time in the propensity 
of companies to patent their innovations. The number of ASIC-technology related 
patents increased from 50 patents in 1988 up to 342 in 1995. In 1996 the number 
dropped again to 289 patents. Part of this growth is the result of the growing importance 
of ASIC-products and the accelerating changes in this technological field. Moreover, 
firms are increasingly aware of the earnings they can reap from by improving intellectual 
property management (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Teece, 1998; Rivette and Kline, 
2000).  
 
Next, dummy variables were used to indicate which type of ASIC-producer a company 
is. Firms can be involved exclusively in the production of gate arrays, standard cells or 
PLDs, or they can be involved in more segments at the same time. Segments are 
important in the sense that firms in each segment face different technologies, different 
competitors and different competitive or technological dynamics. Therefore, firms can 
vary in their propensity to patent simply because they are active in other segments. 
 
A last dummy variable is included to control for possible biases due to the fact that some 
large companies produce ASICs only for their internal needs (captive market), i.e. for 
internal supply as parts in their electronic systems. These captive producers are a small 
minority of ASIC-producing companies but are nonetheless important in terms of 
                                                     
16  We choose to proxy pioneering technologies in this way because there were only a few patents 
  21
technological capabilities (e.g. IBM and DEC). They establish technological alliances for 
the same reasons as ASIC-vendors.  
 
We furthermore included two organizational variables. First, the natural logarithm of 
‘corporate sales’ was included as a control variable. Large companies have the 
possibility to invest large amounts of money in R&D. Assuming that there exists a 
positive correlation between technological input and output (Pakes and Griliches, 1984) 
large firms will have a higher rate of innovation than small firms. The second control 
variable is the natural logarithm of the ASIC-sales of a company. Firms with a 
considerable stake in the ASIC-market can defend or improve their market position by 
rejuvenating or reinforcing their technological capital. This, in turn, requires a high 
rate of innovation. Finally, innovation output is a function of contemporary and 
lagged flow of the firms’ annual R&D expenditures (Pakes and Griliches, 1984; Hall, 
et al.; Griliches, 1984, 1986). Since, there is a high correlation between sales and 
R&D expenditures (corr. = 0.96) we added R&D-intensity as a control. We expect 
that higher R&D-intensity will lead to higher patenting rate when controlling for size 
of the company. 
 
Finally, we introduced the annual growth rate of the ASIC market. High growth rates 
offer companies new economic opportunities stimulating them to invest more in 
R&D, which in turn should lead to more patents granted to the firm. As a result, we 
expect a positive coefficient for this variable. 
 
Model specification and econometric issues  
The dependent variable is a count variable - i.e. the weighted number of patents a firm 
filed for in a particular year. A Poisson regression approach provides a natural 
baseline model for such data (Hausman et al., 1984; Henderson and Cockburn, 1996).  
 
A Poisson regression assumes that the mean and variance of the event count are equal. 
However, for pooled cross-section count data this assumption is likely to be violated, 
since it is well know that count data suffer from overdispersion (i.e. the variance 
exceeds the mean). This overdispersion is particularly relevant in the case of 
                                                                                                                                                        
in the sample that did not cite any other patent. 
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unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. the possibility that identical firms on the measured 
characteristics are still different on unmeasured characteristics17. Unobserved 
heterogeneity may be the result of differences between companies in their innovation 
generating capabilities, and as a consequence, also in their propensity or ability to 
patent.  
 
In this case, the negative binomial model is more adequate. This model is highly 
related to the Poisson model and has the advantage over the latter that it allows for a 
different mean and variance. Since we use pooled cross-section data with several 
observations on the same firms at different points in time, we modeled the data using 
a random effects negative binomial regression (Hausman et al., 1984)18.  
 
Including the sum of patents that a firm has filed for in the last five years (moving 
window approach) as an additional variable is a common method of controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity (Heckman and Borjas, 1980). A firm’s history in filing for 
the two types of patents is an instrumental variable that helps to partial out the 
unobserved differences across companies. Furthermore, part of the heterogeneity 
between the subsectors, country of origin or years can be captured by including 
dummy variables in the model. First, the propensity to patent may be partly 
determined by the nationality and/or the sector of the companies. Similarly, we 
introduced annual dummy variables to account for changes over time: they may 
capture the ever growing importance of intellectual capital forcing companies to file 
more patents over the years, or macroeconomic conditions that may affect the ASIC 
industry. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 3 presents a correlation matrix and descriptive statistics for the different 
variables. Table 4 shows the results from the random effects negative binomial 
regressions testing the different hypotheses. 
  
                                                     
17  The presence of overdispersion does not bias the regression coefficients but the computed 
standard errors in the Poisson regression are understated, so that the statistical significance is 
overestimated. 
18  In particular, we assumed that the overdispersion parameter is drawn from a beta distribution. 
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Model 1 in table 4 functions as a baseline model and includes the three types of 
dummy variables (the coefficients for the annual dummy variables are not reported), 
control variables such as corporate sales, ASIC-sales, annual market growth rate, and 
the technological capital (cumulative patent count) as a control variable for 
unobserved heterogeneity. Firm size (corporate sales) has a positive and significant 
effect on the rate of innovation: this suggests that large companies are technologically 
and financially better equipped to innovate in the ASIC technology field. Next, ASIC-
sales have a positive and significant effect on the patent rate indicating that companies 
with a considerable stake in ASIC-market also stronger invest in technology, which, 
in its turn, invigorates their competitive advantage. Captive producers have a higher 
patent citation rate but the coefficient is only weakly significant in the following 
models in table 4. ASIC market growth - which can be considered as a proxy for the 
technology maturity - has no impact on the patent citation rate. Patents of European 
based companies are less cited than those of US-based or Asian companies. Finally, 
the significant coefficients of different industry segments indicate that the patent 
citation rate is not homogenous for the whole ASIC market. 
 
Model 2 in table 4 adds the existing technological capital as an exploratory variable to 
the model. The existing technological capital of a company has a positive and highly 
significant effect on its innovative performance. An increase of one percent in the 
prior technological capital of a company leads to an increase in the patent citation rate 
of 5.4%. This supports the first hypothesis: companies that have an extensive 
technological capital get relatively more patent citations than other companies19. 
 
Model 3 includes the technology alliances formed by each company during the last 
five years. We also included the squared term because the second hypothesis suggests 
an inverted-U shaped relationship between the patent citation rate and the social 
capital of a company. The findings strongly support this hypothesis: the negative sign 
for the squared term indicates that there are decreasing returns to scale and that at 
some point there is a level of social capital beyond which companies are at risk to be 
overembedded. Model 3 also adds the interaction term between ‘social capital’ and 
                                                     
19  Negative binomial regressions assume a multiplicative relationship between the dependent 
variable and the regressors, so that the partial effect of a variable can be understood as a multiplier 
rate. 
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‘technological capital’ in order to understand how they jointly affect the rate of 
innovation of companies. The negative and highly significant coefficient corroborates 
hypothesis 3.  
 
In order to correctly understand the joint effect of social capital and technological 
capital on the innovative performance of firms, we first need to look at the partial 
effects of both types of capital on the innovative performance (i.e. multiplier of the 
patent citation rate)20. Technological capital moderates the relationship between social 
capital and innovative performance. This basically has two consequences. First, a 
larger amount of technological capital decreases the positive impact of social capital 
on the rate of innovation. In other words, companies with small internal technological 
capabilities - e.g. start-ups, technological laggards or incumbents that want to get 
access to a new technology developed by other companies - profit most from their 
network of technological alliances. Second, higher technological capital requires 
lower social capital to ‘maximize’ the patent citation rate.  
 
Similarly, social capital moderates the impact of prior technological capital on the rate 
of innovation of a company. The effect of priori technological capital on the patent 
citation rate is positive for companies that did not establish a network of alliances. 
The positive effect gradually drops the stronger the company is embedded in its 
alliances network.  
 
The total impact of both types of capital on the rate of innovation is visualized in 
figure 4: 
 
 Insert here figure 4 
 
The graph compares the innovation performance of companies with no technological 
and social capital - the benchmark - to patenting rates of companies that have invested 
previously in one or both types of capital. In order to avoid the effect of a few outliers 
we omitted five observations with the highest values for prior technological and social 
                                                     
20  The partial effect of the prior technical capital (TC) in Table 4, Model 3 is exp[TC*(0.0591-
0.0015*SC)], where SC is the social capital. The partial effect of social capital is 
exp[SC*(0.1474-0.0023*SC-0.0015*TC)].  
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capital. The resulting plane in figure 4 is restricted to firms with social capital smaller 
than 30 ‘weighted’ alliances and technological capital smaller than 34 patents.  
 
The figure shows a number of interesting points. First, there is a ‘curve of optimal 
solutions’ maximizing the rate of innovation for each ratio of technological and social 
capital: for each level of technological capital companies on the left (right) of that 
‘curve’ can improve their innovation performance by increasing (decreasing) their 
technological or/and social capital. Moreover, the ‘optimal’ size of the alliance 
network decreases with an increase of technological capital. If a company has no prior 
patent portfolio the optimal number of ‘weighted’ alliances is 32. This number is 
reduced to 21 alliances when the company has a prior technological capital of 20 
patents. Firms may over-invest in social capital as has been argued in the literature 
(Kogut et al., 1992; Harrigan, 1985): there exists an area in figure where the effect of 
social capital on innovative performance is negative. For companies with no prior 
patents this area starts at high levels of embeddedness (32 ‘weighted’ alliances) but 
this threshold decreases with increasing levels of technological capital of a 
company21.  
 
Companies can improve their innovative performance by investing in social or/and 
technological capital when the size of their existing internal technological capabilities 
and social network is small. Hence, companies that have low levels of technological 
capital and social capital can improve their innovative performance by investing in 
both types of capital. On the contrary, when a company has strong internal 
technological resources and an extensive alliance portfolio it can only improve its rate 
of innovation by reducing its alliance network. Extending a company’s patent 
portfolio when it is already extensive22 improves the innovation performance – at 
least for the companies in the sample – but its impact shrinks the larger the existing 
patent portfolio. In theory it is possible that the effect of technological capital on the 
innovative performance is negative if social capital is larger than 39 ‘weighted’ 
alliances – and thus beyond the maximal value for that variable (see table 2). 
 
                                                     
21  Only a few outliers in our sample have a social capital that exceeds this threshold. 
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Second, the plane in figure 4 provides no clear evidence for hypothesis 4. Although 
the interaction term is negative, its impact is too small to end up with two local 
optimal points reflecting two strategies that could coexist in the same industry: one 
that is based on relatively high levels of social capital combined with low levels of 
technological capital and the other one where strong internal technological 
capabilities are combined with a limited set of alliances. Figure 4 on the contrary 
shows that larger patent portfolios always enhance the innovative performance of a 
company. Consequently, ASIC-producers with extended patent stocks and a moderate 
number of partners have the highest innovative performance23. 
 
Third, a closer inspection of the plane in figure 4 shows that companies with a broad 
existing patent portfolio benefit much more from collaborating with a few alliance 
partners than their counterparts that have a small patent portfolio. The ‘absorptive 
capacity’ of the former facilitates the generation of joint knowledge with their alliance 
partners. As a result, the limited number of partners they need to reach the optimal 
innovative performance might be explained by their strong absorptive capacity that is 
the result of previous investments in technology. Similarly, the effect of prior 
technological capital on the technological performance of a company increases 
progressively with higher levels of social capital up to a level of 14 to 20 alliances24. 
In short, we have evidence that at small levels of social en technological capital 
companies can increase technological performance more than proportionately with 
increasing levels of these two types of capital. Beyond the threshold of 14-20 
alliances the impact of prior technological capital is decreasing again and even 
becomes negative after (the theoretical level of) 39 alliances.  
 
Model 4 introduces the innovative performance of the alliance partners. The 
coefficient is positive but not statistically significant indicating that the patent citation 
                                                                                                                                                        
22  A closer inspection of figure 6 shows that the impact becomes smaller once social capital is 
larger than 20 ‘weighted’ alliances for low levels of prior technological capital and larger than 
14 alliances for the highest levels of existing technological capital represented in figure 6. 
23  Hypothesis 4 is corroborated by the results, when a simple count of the patents is used as 
dependent variable. The difference in results is an indication that companies with a large patent 
stocks have relatively more important patents that are more frequently cited than companies that 
have a small technological capital. 
24  This threshold depends in its turn on the level of prior technological capital. 
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rate of ASIC-producers is on average not enhanced by the technological strengths of 
their alliance partners. As a result, we have no empirical evidence for hypothesis 5. 
 
Model 5 tests the two final hypotheses and offers support for both of them. Firms 
experimenting with novel technologies are more likely to have a higher patent citation 
rate. These firms are able to value the potential of novel technologies in a more 
accurate way. They perceive the potential threats of disruptive technologies more 
easily, and they are more open to new avenues for research. However, too much 
experimentation with unfamiliar technologies is counterproductive: the negative and 
significant coefficient for the squared term of novel technologies indicates that 
experimentation with novel technologies should be in balance with the exploitation of 
familiar technologies. In line with this argument we expect a positive sign for the 
coefficient of the ‘novel technologies’-variable and a negative sign for the squared 
term. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is substantial: other variables held 
constant, one-standard deviation increase above the mean in the experimentation with 
novel technologies results in a 40.1 percent increase in a company’s rate of 
innovation25.  
 
Finally, hypothesis 7 suggests that experimenting with pioneering technologies 
increases the rate of innovation of a company. The results in Model 5 support this 
hypothesis although the coefficient is only weakly significant. A one-standard 
deviation increase in the experimentation of pioneering technologies leads to a 9.8 
percent (=exp[0.2754*0.34]) increase in the rate of innovation. Hence, companies that 
successfully patented a ‘pioneering technology’-innovation increase their rate of 
innovation in the subsequent years.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
The increasing requirements of the organizational environment have forced 
companies in high tech industries to establish networks of technology alliances. The 
                                                     
25  The partial effect of the novel technologies (NT) in Model 5 is exp[NT*(0.3020 -0.0304*NT)]. 
For an average company this implies a rate of innovation increase of 26.8 percent 
(exp[0.86*(0.3020-0.0304*0.86)]). For a company that is highly involved in experimenting with 
novel technologies (one-standard deviation above the mean) this increase is 66.9 percent 
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internal development of technological resources is interwoven with the external 
acquisition of technologies through alliances. Both technological and social capital 
determine the rate of innovation of companies. In the literature, both types of capital 
have been conceived as complements: they are mutually reinforcing each other’s 
effect on the rate of innovation of a company (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane and 
Lubatkin, 1998; Duysters and Hagedoorn, 2000). 
 
In this paper we claim that the effect of an increase in the internal prior technology 
capabilities of a company or an extension of the alliance portfolio on its innovation 
performance depends on the size of its existing technological and social capital. For 
low degrees of internal technological capabilities and/or small alliance portfolios 
increases in either one of both types of capital will increase progressively a 
company’s rate of innovation. Technological and social capital are found to mutually 
reinforce each other’s impact on the technological performance of a company. 
However, we also found empirical support for the change in interaction between both 
types of capital in the case technological capabilities and the alliance network of a 
company increase. At high levels, technological and social capital are substitutes: the 
company with strong technological resources does not need an extensive portfolio of 
alliances to come up with a strong technological performance. Companies with 
extended technology alliance networks benefit from a strong patent portfolio but the 
marginal benefits from increased patent stock becomes smaller the larger their social 
capital. 
 
Stuart (2000) argued that the technological performance of a company is not so much 
determined by the size of the alliance network but rather by the characteristics of the 
focal firm’s alliance partners. Contrary to his findings we find no credible support for 
this claim. It is possible that in the specific context of the ASIC industry the 
technological prominence of the partners are less important because of the continuous 
stream of ‘competence destroying’ innovations by new entrants. Another possibility is 
that slightly different variables will confirm the importance of technological 
characteristics of the partners. One possible alternative is to calculate differences 
between the technological capital of the focal firm and that of its partners.  
                                                                                                                                                        
(exp[2.17(0.3020-0.0304*2.17]). The highest possible value for the partial effect (111.6 percent) 
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 Finally, companies that experiment with novel and pioneering technologies are found 
to have a higher rate of innovation in subsequent years. This is an interesting finding 
because it indicates that companies, which almost exclusively focus on the 
exploitation of their existing technologies, are likely to get trapped in their own 
technological competences. This supports the idea of Leonard-Barton (1992) that core 
competencies can turn into core rigidities if companies are not rejuvenating their 
existing capabilities by exploring new technological fields. 
 
This paper clearly contains a number of limitations. One important limitation is that 
we did not model the ‘interorganizational absorptive capacity’ of companies 
explicitly. We assumed (and found empirical evidence) that the technological capital 
in a company has a moderating effect on the relationship between its social capital 
and its rate of innovation. Modeling explicitly the industry and organizational factors 
that have an impact on the absorptive capacity of a company could improve our 
understanding of the interaction between technological capital and alliance portfolios. 
 
Future research on the dyadic level (dyad-year as unit of observation) could also 
complement the firm level analysis about the relationship between technological 
resources and alliance networks. An analysis on the dyadic level allows us to focus on 
the question how the probability of the formation of new alliances is affected by (the 
difference between) the existing technological capital of the allying companies.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
is reached for companies having experimented with 4.85 novel technologies. 
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Table 1: ASIC definitions 
 
 
I. Semicustom IC: A monolithic circuit that has one or more customized mask layers, but does not have all 
mask layers customized, and is sold to only one customer. 
Gate arrays: A monolithic IC usually composed of columns and rows of transistors. One or 
more layers of metal interconnect and are used to customize the chip. 
Linear array: An array of transistors and resistors that performs the functions of several linear 
ICs and discrete devices. 
 
II. Custom IC: A monolithic circuit that is customized on all mask layers and is sold to only one customer. 
Standard cell IC: A monolithic circuit that is customized on all mask layers using a cell 
library that embodies pre-characterized circuit structures. 
Full custom IC: A monolithic circuit that is at least partially “handcrafted”. Handcrafting 
refers to custom layout and connection work that is accomplished without the aid of standard 
cells. 
 
III. Programmable Logic Device (PLD): A monolithic circuit with fuse, antifuse, or memory cell-based 
logic that may be programmed (customized), and in some cases, reprogrammed by the user. 
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA): A PLD that offers fully flexible interconnects, 
fully flexible logic arrays, and requires functional placement and routing. 
Electrically Programmable Analog Circuit (EPAC): A PLD that allows the user to program and 
reprogram basic analog devices. 
Table 2: Definitions of dependent and independent variables 
 
 
Variable name Variable description Expected effect 
 
Number of patents Count of the number of patents a firm filed for in the current year (t). Only patents that were granted -------- 
  to the company are taken into consideration  
Cumulative patentst-1 Count of the number of ASIC-related patents that a firm filed for during the previous four years Positive 
  (t-4 to t-1)  
Cumulative technology alliancest-1  Count of the number of technology alliances a firm established in the five previous years (t-5 to t-1)  Positive 
(Cumulative technology alliancest-1)2  Squared term of the previous variable  Negative  
(Cum. technology alliances t-1) Interaction between the number of ASIC-related patents a firm file for during the last 4 years and Negative 
 * (cum. patents t-1) the number of alliances it formed in the previous 5 years 
Innovative performance of alliance partners Sum of the patent citations received by the firm’s alliance partnersPositive 
Novel technologiest-1 Number of patents filed during the last 3 years in patent classes in which the company had not patented  Positive 
  in the previous 4 years 
(Novel technologiest-1)2 Squared term of the previous variable  Negative 
Pioneering technologiest-1 Number of a firm’s patents that cite no more than one other patent  Positive 
Log ASIC salest-1 Natural logarithm of the ASIC sales of the firm  Positive 
Firm size (log sales)t-1 Natural logarithm of the total sales of the firm  Positive 
ASIC market growtht-1 Annual growth rate of the ASIC market  Positive  
Firm is a captive producer Dummy variable denoting that the firm is not selling ASICs on the market Negative   
Firm is Asian Dummy variable denoting that the firm is headquartered in Asia 
Firm is European Dummy variable denoting that the firm is headquartered in Europe 
Firm is GA-producer Dummy variable denoting that the firm is producing only gate arrays 
Firm is SC-producer Dummy variable denoting that the firm is producing only standard cells 
Firm is PLD-producer Dummy variable denoting that the firm is producing only PLDs 
Firm is GA and SC producer Dummy variable denoting that the firm is producing gate arrays and standard cells 
Firm is GA and PLD producer Dummy variable denoting that the firm is producing gate arrays and PLDs 
 
  
1 
e n . n. . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 13 14 15 6 7
Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
  
Variabl  Mea  S.D  Mi  Max   1 1  1  
                     
1  Cumulative patentst-1 2.67 5.85 0 70                  
2  Cumulative technology alliancest-1 4.05 6.90 0 38 0.33                 
3  Innovative performance of  
 alliance partners 46.91 129.48 0 1251 0.30 0.39                
4  Novel technologiest-1 0.86 1.31 0 11 0.43 0.33 0.37               
5  Pioneering technologiest-1 0.08 0.34 0 3 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.11              
6  R&D intensity 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.41 -0.10 -0.14 -0.06 -0.08 -0.01             
7  Log ASIC salest-1 2.95 2.03 -0.69 7.43 0.47 0.43 0.24 0.30 0.04 -0.09            
8  Firm size (log sales)t-1 6.20 3.30 -0.92 12.60 0.31 0.40 0.21 0.24 0.06 -0.59 0.52           
9  ASIC market growtht-1 0.14 0.03 0.10 0.21 -0.02 0.09 0.00 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02          
10  Firm is a captive producer 0.11 0.31 0 1 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.20 -0.28 0.20 -0.01         
11  Firm is Asian 0.22 0.42 0 1 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 -0.43 0.14 0.40 0.00 -0.10        
12  Firm is European 0.17 0.38 0 1 -0.12 0.15 0.09 -0.11 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.10 0.01 0.12 -0.25       
13  Firm is GA-producer 0.12 0.32 0 1 -0.13 -0.16 -0.10 -0.12 -0.03 0.10 -0.07 -0.13 0.00 -0.02 -0.12 -0.14      
14  Firm is SC-producer 0.18 0.39 0 1 -0.15 -0.15 -0.07 -0.09 -0.04 0.15 -0.12 -0.20 -0.03 0.00 -0.21 0.14 -0.17     
15  Firm is PLD-producer 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.24 -0.01 0.07 0.15 -0.02 0.25 0.16 -0.13 -0.02 -0.09 -0.14 -0.12 -0.10 -0.13    
16  Firm is GA and PLD producer 0.01 0.09 0 1 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02   
17  Firm is GA and SC producer 0.30 0.46 0 1 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.10 -0.24 0.44 0.38 0.00 -0.12 0.35 -0.03 -0.24 -0.31 -0.17 -0.06  
18  Firm is SC and PLD producer 0.01 0.08 0 1 -0.03 0.17 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 
      
  
 
N = 830 observations 
Table 4: Determinants of the patent citation rate of ASIC producers, 1988-1996 
 
  
 Variable Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  
 
Cumulative patentst-1  0.0526*** 0.0591*** 0.0609*** 0.0537***  
   (0.0065) (0.0077) (0.0079) (0.0082)  
Cumulative technology   0.1474*** 0.1436*** 0.1345***  
 alliancest-1   (0.0236) (0.0238) (0.0236)  
(Cumulative technology   -0.0023*** -0.0022*** -0.0023***  
 alliancest-1)2   (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)  
(Cum. technology alliances t-1)   -0.0015*** -0.0017*** -0.0018***  
 * (cum. patents t-1)   (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)  
Innovative performance of    0.0004   
 alliance partners    (0.0004)   
Novel     0.3020*** 
 technologiest-1     (0.0995) 
(Novel     -0.0304* 
 technologiest-1)2     (0.0183) 
Pioneering     0.2754** 
 technologiest-1     (0.1163) 
R&D intensity 3.14166** 3.7589** 3.1553* 3.2673** 3.4754**  
  (1.6037) (1.5581) (1.6378) (1.6447) (1.6816)  
Log ASIC salest-1 0.3813*** 0.2786*** 0.1504*** 0.1586*** 0.1581***  
  (0.0504) (0.0507) (0.0536) (0.0543) (0.0540)  
Firm size 0.2323*** 0.2184*** 0.1256*** 0.1250*** 0.1212***  
 (log sales)t-1 (0.0450) (0.0438) (0.0435) (0.0436) (0.0440)  
ASIC market growtht-1 10.2939 11.2207 5.1625 5.341 10.7451  
  (12.6046) (12.4985) (11.2919) (11.3558) (12.0914)  
Firm is a captive 0.5592** 0.4449* 0.4625* 0.4767* 0.4862*  
 producer (0.2618) (0.2568) (0.2628) (0.2638) (0.2637)  
Firm is Asian 0.2721 0.2225 0.5582*** 0.5795*** 0.5948***  
  (0.1945) (0.1906) (0.2006) (0.2018) (0.1995)  
Firm is European -0.7181*** -0.6197*** -0.8246*** -0.8349*** -0.7924***  
  (0.2341) (0.2295) (0.2348) (0.2355) (0.2392)  
Firm is GA-producer -0.6963** -0.5963** -0.1918 -0.2067 -0.1661  
  (0.2879) (0.2833) (0.2935) (0.2935) (0.2893)  
Firm is SC-producer -1.0775*** -0.9512*** -0.7136*** -0.7302*** -0.6835** 
  (0.2729) (0.2692) (0.2737) (0.2738) (0.2725) 
Firm is PLD-producer 0.5550** 0.3121 0.6117** 0.5418* 0.4316 
  (0.2739) (0.2765) (0.3013) (0.3072) (0.3037) 
Firm is GA and SC -0.5111*** -0.3441** -0.1247 -0.1598 -0.2576 
 producer (0.1688) (0.1637) (0.1790) (0.1812) (0.1784) 
Firm is GA and PLD 1.2699*** 1.3787*** 1.1467** 1.0968* 1.1277** 
 producer (0.4883) (0.4639) (0.4807) (0.4841) (0.4695) 
Firm is SC and PLD -0.8289 -0.6303 -1.3176* -1.2787* -1.3258* 
 producer (0.7507) (0.7456) (0.7463) (0.7475) (0.7497) 
Year dummy variables included 
Constant -8.0146*** -7.8331*** -6.6201*** -6.6692*** -7.7684*** 
  (2.4387) (2.4169) (2.1878) (2.1996) (2.3423) 
  
Number of firms  99 99 99 99 99  
Number of firms-years 830 830 830 830 830  
Log-likelihood -2109.3 -2084.5 -2051.9 -2051.2 -2042.8  
Likelihood-ratio test  
 panel vs. pooled (χ2) 63.52*** 43.88*** 45.59*** 46.77*** 44.34***  
 
 
Notes:  *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10  
‘Year dummy variable’-coefficients are not reported in the table. 
The models use a random effects negative binomial regression. The sample is an unbalanced panel with 99 ASIC 
producers and 830 firm-years (units of observation). 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1: The ASIC technology field 
 Figure 2: The segments in the ASIC technology field 
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Figure 3: The ASIC technology field  
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Figure 4: Impact of social and technical capital on the patent citation rate
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